02 — Our Answer
We removed the part that knows you.
Not "we promise not to look". There is nothing to look at. And when you pay us, the payment and the thing you bought are cryptographically severed, so the one place every other private messenger re-attaches your identity is the one place we close.
How it works, in plain words
When you install Spojiti it makes you twelve words. From those twelve words your device derives a keypair, and that keypair is who you are. There is no registration form, no code by SMS, no email link. The relay knows an opaque account identifier and nothing else, because there is nothing else to know.
When you send a message, your device seals it for the recipient's device before it leaves. Our server carries a sealed envelope it cannot open, hands it over, and deletes it. When you make a call, the audio and video go directly between the two devices wherever the network allows it; our relay is a fallback path, not a participant.
When you buy Premium, your device prepares a token and blinds it. Our server signs something it cannot read, you unblind it, and the result proves you are entitled without revealing which purchase bought it. The metaphor we use on the public site: paying cash at a counter for a blank ticket. The ticket is valid. The counter has no idea whose it is.
Shipped and running today
- One-to-one and group messaging, media, voice notes, receipts — sealed end to end
- Encrypted voice and video calls, peer-to-peer where the network allows
- Post-quantum cryptography in production across key agreement, the session ratchet and authentication
- Sealed sender — the relay no longer stores who sent an envelope
- Anonymous payments — blind-signed entitlements, proven end to end on our own rail
- Encrypted at rest on device, keyed from the same twelve words
- iPhone, Android and Mac from one codebase, build 356
Built, not yet launched
- Public Echoes — the valve is deliberately closed on production until counsel confirms our intermediary position
- Rich posts and short video inside Echoes, already in the tree
- Windows and Linux desktop
- Multi-region failover — today our disaster recovery is a manual restore, measured in hours of hands-on attention rather than minutes of automation
- The open-source core — the extraction tooling exists and runs; the public repositories do not exist yet
The ledger — exactly what our servers can still see
This is the table we are proudest of, and it is the one most companies would leave out. An absolute claim is the first thing a critic quotes back at you, so here is the unabsolute version.
| Can the relay see it? | What that means | |
|---|---|---|
| Message and media content | No | Sealed on the device. The relay stores an opaque blob and deletes it on delivery. |
| Your real identity | Never | A keypair from a phrase. No phone number, email or name is ever requested or stored. |
| Which payment bought which entitlement | No | The blind signature severs them. This is the part we believe is genuinely novel. |
| Who sent an envelope | No | Sealed sender shipped in build 317. There is no sender field to store. |
| Who an envelope is for | Yes | We need it to deliver. Hiding the recipient is a mixnet problem and it is explicitly out of scope for version one. Signal beats us on this row today. |
| That a device is online | Yes | Ephemeral. It dies with the socket and is never written down. |
| A push token | Yes | Apple and Google require one. Our wakes carry no content — only a coarse class, so the phone can say "a message" or "a missed call" and nothing more. |
| An IP address | In transit | Seen by the gateway, never logged. Tor and VPN friendly, by design. |
Why "zero-PII" and not "zero-knowledge"
Zero-knowledge is a precise term in cryptography with a specific meaning, and using it loosely is the kind of thing that costs you a security researcher's respect forever. We do not claim it. What we claim is narrower and checkable: zero personally identifiable information, end-to-end encrypted. No identity is collected, so none can be produced.
The same discipline runs through the whole company. Our build pipeline contains a gate that refuses to publish a marketing claim on our website if no code gate enforces it — if the subscribe page says a feature is Premium, a test proves the app actually requires Premium for it, or the publish fails. That tool exists because we caught ourselves selling two things we did not deliver. We would rather show you the gate than the incident.
What we can produce is what we hold: a random account identifier, ciphertext in transit, and no names, numbers, contacts or content. We are not promising to resist an order. We are a company that cannot be a honeypot, because there is no honey. That is a much more durable promise than a policy, and it is the one we are asking you to invest in.