02 — Our Answer

We removed the part that knows you.

Not "we promise not to look". There is nothing to look at. And when you pay us, the payment and the thing you bought are cryptographically severed, so the one place every other private messenger re-attaches your identity is the one place we close.

How it works, in plain words

When you install Spojiti it makes you twelve words. From those twelve words your device derives a keypair, and that keypair is who you are. There is no registration form, no code by SMS, no email link. The relay knows an opaque account identifier and nothing else, because there is nothing else to know.

When you send a message, your device seals it for the recipient's device before it leaves. Our server carries a sealed envelope it cannot open, hands it over, and deletes it. When you make a call, the audio and video go directly between the two devices wherever the network allows it, and through our own TURN relay where it does not; a larger group call goes through our call server. Either way the sound and picture are encrypted between the phones, and sealed a second time under a key made for that call that travels inside the chat's own encrypted session (always on the call server; on a direct call wherever both apps can), so neither box can hear the call.

When you buy a pack, your device prepares a token and blinds it. Our server signs something it cannot read, you unblind it, and the result proves you are entitled without revealing which purchase bought it. The metaphor we use on the public site: paying cash at a counter for a blank ticket. The ticket is valid. The counter has no idea whose it is.

Shipped and running today

  • One-to-one and group messaging, media, voice notes, receipts — sealed end to end
  • Encrypted voice and video calls, peer-to-peer where the network allows
  • Post-quantum cryptography in production across key agreement, the session ratchet and authentication
  • Sealed sender — the relay no longer stores who sent an envelope
  • Anonymous payments — blind-signed entitlements, proven end to end on our own rail
  • Encrypted at rest on device, keyed from the same twelve words
  • iPhone, Android, Mac and Windows from one codebase, more than four hundred builds
  • The Private Messenger Core, open source under the AGPL v3 at github.com/Spojiti — the free one-to-one text path, app and relay, for anyone to check

Built, not yet launched

  • Public Echoes — switched off in every app until its go-live list is done, our EULA addendum with counsel among it; its service runs on no box yet
  • Rich posts and short video inside Echoes, already in the tree
  • India's number verification and sealed origin — built, and switched on at launch; on the beta it is off
  • Automatic failover — today each cell has a live standby and a snapshot every thirty minutes, proved by a restore drill, but moving to the standby is a manual step; the automation is designed, not built

The ledger — exactly what our servers can still see

This is the table we are proudest of, and it is the one most companies would leave out. An absolute claim is the first thing a critic quotes back at you, so here is the unabsolute version.

Can the relay see it? What that means
Message and media contentNoSealed on the device. A message is an opaque envelope the relay keeps until your contact's devices collect it, five days at most, and then deletes; a photo or file is an opaque blob it keeps until no message can still carry it, six days at most.
Your real identityNeverA keypair from a phrase. No email or name is ever asked for or stored, and outside India no phone number. An Indian account's number is stored only sealed: opening it takes Spojiti's key and a ministry's, under a court order, for one sender.
Which payment bought which entitlementNoThe blind signature severs them. This is the part we believe is genuinely novel.
Who sent an envelopeNoSealed sender shipped in build 317. There is no sender field to store.
Who an envelope is forYesWe need it to deliver. Hiding the recipient is a mixnet problem and it is explicitly out of scope for version one. Signal's servers see it too. And because a group message goes out as one batch of sealed copies, the relay sees which accounts receive copies together; it keeps no record of groups.
That a device is onlineYesWhile it is connected, and which contacts' online status it asks for. Presence dies with the socket; what is written down is when the account last connected, so a device cold for ninety days can be removed.
A push tokenYesApple and Google require one. Our wakes carry no content — only a coarse class, so the phone can say "a message" or "a missed call", and on a ring an opaque call id, and nothing more.
An IP addressIn transitSeen by the gateway, never logged. Tor and VPN friendly, by design.
The same ledger is published on our public security page, for the beta as it runs today; the Indian number joins it there when number verification is switched on. We would rather you read it from us than find it in our own source.

Why "zero-PII" and not "zero-knowledge"

Zero-knowledge is a precise term in cryptography with a specific meaning, and using it loosely is the kind of thing that costs you a security researcher's respect forever. We do not claim it. What we claim is narrower and checkable: zero personally identifiable information, end-to-end encrypted. No identity is collected, so none can be produced.

The same discipline runs through the whole company. Our build pipeline contains a gate that refuses to publish a marketing claim on our website if no code gate enforces it — if the pricing page says a pack raises a limit, the number is read from the app's own limits table, or the publish fails. That tool exists because we caught ourselves selling two things we did not deliver. We would rather show you the gate than the incident.

What a law-enforcement request gets

What we can produce is what we hold: a random account identifier, ciphertext in transit, and no names, contacts or content. For an Indian account, a validated court order or a Section 69 direction can open one thing more — the sealed number of the first sender of one message — and only with a government key beside ours, every step recorded. We are not promising to resist an order. We are a company that cannot be a honeypot, because nothing is readable in bulk. That is a much more durable promise than a policy, and it is the one we are asking you to invest in.

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The Problem